Civil Rights Recap: October 2, 2020

This post is part of KLLF’s series of semi-weekly blog posts rounding up interesting civil rights cases ruled on by the United States Supreme Court or the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Supreme Court

The Supreme Court is currently not in session. It will begin its next term on October 5.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., Docket No. 19-2308 (2d Cir.)

Plaintiffs George Mandala and Charles Barnett brought a Title VII disparate impact class action against Defendant NTT Data, Inc., arguing that the company’s alleged policy not to hire applicants with certain criminal convictions has a disproportionate and discriminatory effect on African-American applicants. To support that disparate impact claim, Mandala and Barnett relied largely on national statistics showing that, on average, African Americans are more likely to be arrested and convicted than whites.

The District Court dismissed Mandala and Barnett’s claims. It essentially reasoned that the fact that a disparity exists among the general population does not sufficiently indicate that it exists among the pool of NTT Data’s applicants. This was particularly so, the court ruled, given that the position Mandala and Barnett applied for at NTT Data required certain educational and technical credentials that made general national statistics particularly unreliable in this case. 

Last week, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court, adopting much of the same reasoning.

The two justices in the majority, Judges Sullivan and Nardini, are both Trump appointees, while the lone dissenter, Judge Chin, is an Obama appointee. In dissent, Judge Chin argued that the plaintiffs’ reliance on national statistics was not improper at the pleading stage and that they viably alleged that NTT Data’s policy had a disparate impact on African-American job applicants. He argued that the lower court should not have dismissed the complaint because Plaintiffs had met the “minimal burden” of presenting evidence sufficient to “suggest” an inference of discriminatory motivation, which is all that is required of plaintiffs at the pleading stage: “Instead of drawing the reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the district court [improperly] rejected the national statistics, requiring plaintiffs to present more: the precise statistical evidence they would use to prove their claim.”

For an excellent article discussing this precise question and summarizing the barriers plaintiffs face in mounting disparate impact claims against criminal record checks, take a look at Candice S. Thomas’ article in the University of Cincinnati Law Review, Felony is the New N-Word: Statistical Evidence to Measure a Disparate Impact Claim for the Use of Criminal Records Checks in Employment Decisions. For another great article discussing issues with how courts currently employ statistics in disparate impact claims, check out Jennifer Peresie’s article in the Indiana Law Journal, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination.

Ferreira v. City of Binghamton, Docket No. 17-3234 (2d Cir.)

Plaintiff Jesus Ferreira was shot in the stomach by City of Binghamton Police Officer Kevin Miller when a SWAT Team executed a no-knock search warrant on an apartment Ferreira was staying in as an overnight guest. Miller, who was the first member of the SWAT team to enter the apartment, shot Ferreira in the stomach with an assault rifle “immediately” after entering the apartment, ostensibly mistaking the gray Xbox controller Ferreira was holding for “.38 caliber gray snub7 nosed revolver.”

Ferreira brought an excessive force claim against Miller under Section 1983 as well as various New York State Laws claims alleging Miller was negligent and that the City was liable as Miller’s employer for Miller’s negligence and the police department’s own negligence in the planning of the raid. After a trial, the jury found in Ferreira’s favor as to his state law claims against the city, awarding him $3 million in damages. However—here is where things get a little complicated—the jury simultaneously found Miller himself had not been negligent, and rejected Ferreira’s federal civil rights claim. The City consequently moved for judgment as a matter of law to set aside the jury verdicts against it, while Ferreria moved to set aside the jury verdict dismissing his federal claim against Miller.

The District Court ultimately denied Ferreira’s motion and granted the City’s. The District Court granted the City’s motion on grounds that Ferreria had failed to demonstrate that he was in a “special relationship” with the City; accordingly, the City owed him only the normal duty of care it owed to the public at large, which, the court found, the City hadn’t violated. In the alternative, the District Court held judgment for the City was warranted, even if there was a special relationship, for two reasons. First, the District Court reasoned that Ferreria’s claim that the city negligently planned the raid amounted to a claim of negligent investigation, and New York bars claims for negligent investigation under Ellsworth v. City of Gloversville. Second, the District Court reasoned that, because the jury found Miller had not acted negligently, Ferreria had failed to demonstrate the City, through its employees, violated “acceptable police practice,” such that the City ultimately had discretionary immunity. (Discretionary immunity is a doctrine that precludes the city from being liable for the “discretionary”—as opposed to “ministerial,” i.e., mandatory—acts of an employee where it was the employee’s discretionary decision that caused the harm at issue.)

 The Second Circuit held the District Court erred in granting the City’s motion for JMOL for a number of reasons. First, the Second Circuit held that even if, as the jury found, Miller himself was not negligent (and, as such, did not violate “acceptable police practice”), it is nonetheless possible that certain actions of City employees in the planning of the raid violated acceptable police practice such that the City is not entitled to discretionary immunity. Second, the Second Circuit held that Ferreria’s claim that the city negligently planned the raid was not precluded by Ellsworth’s bar on claims of “negligent investigation,” reasoning that the Ellsworth bar is limited to challenges to the validity of an arrest (e.g., challenging an arrest as based upon a negligently undertaken unlawful search) but does not apply to claims like Ferreria’s that are based on personal injury. Finally, the Second Circuit asked the New York Court of Appeals to rule on whether New York’s special duty rule applies only to claims where the government is negligent in response to an ongoing or threatened injury inflicted by a third party, or whether it also applies to claims, like Ferreira’s, that the government itself negligently inflicted injury. 

Humphrey v. Crea, Docket No. 19-2767 (2d Cir.) [Summary Order]

 Darnell Humphrey sued four officers of the Waterbury Police Department for using excessive force while arresting him. The jury returned a verdict for Humphrey, awarding him $38,000 in pain and suffering and $30,000 in punitive damages. But Humphrey had presented undisputed evidence of over $100,000 in medical bills for serious injuries stemming from the arrest, which the jury did not see fit to compensate him for. Humphrey argued for an amendment and/or new trial, arguing the jury’s failure to award him any economic damages was a miscarriage of justice and a seriously erroneous result given that the jury had found the officers used unlawful excessive force. The District Court denied his motion, noting “the jury’s findings are consistent with a possibility that the jury based its damages verdict solely on [Officer] Crea's taunting of Humphrey and tackling him to the ground rather than Crea's infliction of particular blows that caused medical expenses.” Humphrey appealed.

 The Second Circuit affirmed in a summary order, noting that a finding of excessive force does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to compensatory damages--including medical bills--as a matter of law: “The District Court concluded that the jury’s verdict could be harmonized with the evidence at trial and that the verdict was not seriously erroneous or otherwise a miscarriage of justice. We agree.” 

 If you think that maybe we should just ask the jury what its reasoning was, you’re not alone. Check out Jerome Frank’s 1948 article, The Case for the Special Verdict.

Other Summary Orders:

Toombs v. New York City Housing Authority, Docket No. 19-3109 (2d Cir.)

Affirming District Court’s grant of summary judgment to employer (NYCHA) on plaintiff’s Title VII claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.

Lewis v. City of Waterbury, Docket No. 190385 (2d Cir.)
Affirming District Court’s dismissal of pro se Plaintiff’s case for failure to prosecute when Plaintiff refused to answer questions on cross examination. Plaintiff had brought various Section 1983 claims against the City of Waterbury, the Waterbury Chief of police, and three Waterbury police officers for excessive force and deliberate indifference, among other things.