Civil Rights Recap: September 18, 2020
This post is the first of a series of semi-weekly blog posts KLLF will be putting out rounding up interesting civil rights cases ruled on by the United States Supreme Court or the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals covers New York, Connecticut, and Vermont and is one of thirteen Courts of Appeals across the country, which are all one step below the Supreme Court. It hears appeals from decisions made in the federal district courts in these three states, most of which (but not all) deal with federal or constitutional law. Appeals from the Second Circuit (and the other circuit courts of appeals) are heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Supreme Court
The Supreme Court is currently not in session. It will begin its next term on October 5, following the Justices’ “long conference” on September 29, where the justices meet to consider all the petitions that have come in over the summer recess. You can read about the petitions the Justices will be considering over at SCOTUSblog.
Second Circuit Court of Appeals
United States v. Weaver, Docket No. 18-1697. In an interesting stop-and-frisk case out of Syracuse, a split panel ultimately ruled the police’s search violated the Fourth Amendment, because while the police might have had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was hiding something, they did not have reasonable suspicion he was hiding a weapon, as required by the express terms of Terry v. Ohio [1968]. You can read more about Judge Pooler’s decision, Judge Calabresi’s impassioned concurrence, and Chief Judge Livingston’s fiery dissent on Wait A Second!.
New York v. DHS, Docket No. 20-2537. In October 2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an preliminary “nationwide” injunction against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), enjoining the DHS from implementing, anywhere in the United States, a new rule articulating DHS’s interpretation of the phrase “public charge” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). That rule provides that any immigrant likely to become “a public charge” (i.e.., to need public assistance) is inadmissible to the United States. The rule dramatically expands the amount of people eligible to be deemed public charges. The Supreme Court then stayed that preliminary injunction at DHS’s request in January 2020, allowing the rule to go into effect until the Second Circuit ruled on DHS’s appeal from the district court’s decision. Then, on July 29, 2020, the district court issued a second “nationwide” injunction prohibiting the rule from being enacted, reasoning that the Covid-19 pandemic further heightened the need for the injunction, which DHS appealed. Days later, the Second Circuit narrowed the applicability of the first “nationwide” injunction to the Second Circuit—meaning the rule could not go into effect in Connecticut, New York, and Vermont, but could elsewhere in the country. However, here’s the catch: the district court’s second nationwide injunction still prevented the rule from going into effect anywhere in the country.
So, fast forward to present, and the Second Circuit, expressing doubts that the district court had jurisdiction to enter the second “nationwide” preliminary injunction in the first place given that it was “virtually identical” to the first, found DHS had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and granted the DHS’s motion to stay the second “nationwide” injunction as well. The end result is that the distinct court’s first injunction against the public charge rule remains operative but only in the Second Circuit. In other words, the DHS may not implement the new rule in the Second Circuit, but may elsewhere in the country (at least as long as another Circuit doesn’t similarly enjoin the rule’s application). (If all this sounds confusing, check out Getzel Gerger’s excellent note on the pros and cons of nationwide injunctions in the New York University Law Review.)
D.S. v. Trumbull Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 19-644. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), if the parent of a child with a disability disagrees with an “evaluation” obtained by a school, the parent is entitled to an independent educational evaluation (“IEE”) at public expense unless the school can demonstrate that the evaluation it conducted was appropriate. The evaluations are primarily used to determine the support services the child will receive while at school. D.S.’s school conducted a “functional behavioral assessment” (“FBA”), which D.S.’s parents disagreed with, and D.S.’s parents sought an IEE. Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit held, first, that an FBA does not qualify as an “evaluation” under the relevant provisions of the IDEA; and, second, that parents do not need to file a due process complaint under the IDEA to formally disagree with an evaluation before they are entitled to an IEE.